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WHAT  RATES  OF  INFLATION  will  accompany  various  unemployment 
rates? This question is the central concern of stabilization policy today and 
also a major source of uncertainty for economic forecasting. Whether the 
approach was made through informed judgment or rigorous research, in- 
vestigators have sought the answer to this question in the historic relation 
between unemployment  rates, on the one hand, and rates of wage increase 
on the other, with wage increases then used to explain inflation. With many 
variations and  refinements, this  concept  of  a  trade-off between  wage 
changes and the aggregate  unemployment rate has been the framework for 
most discussions of inflation during the past decade. 
In this view of the inflationary process, the aggregate unemployment 
rate has served as a proxy for the tightness of labor markets. But significant 
changes have been taking place in the composition of the labor force- 
notably an increase in the proportion of teenagers and women-and  in 
the unemployment experience of different age-sex groups. As a result, the 
aggregate unemployment rate in recent years has been an increasingly mis- 
leading proxy for comparing the current labor market with earlier ones. A 
given unemployment rate is associated with a tighter overall labor market 
today than it was ten or twenty years ago. And this means that the trade-off 
between inflation and the aggregate unemployment rate has shifted: To- 
* I want to acknowledge  the research  assistance  I received  from Nancy Hwang and 
Janet Kelly. 
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day, a given unemployment rate is associated with a more inflationary rate 
of wage change than it was in the earlier periods. 
This finding  rests on some measures of labor market tightness that I have 
developed for explaining and predicting wage changes. These are the con- 
cept of a weighted unemployment rate, in which individuals are weighted 
by an estimate of what they would produce if employed, and a measure 
of the dispersion of unemployment. Together they form a better indicator 
of labor market tightness than the aggregate unemployment rate alone. By 
this new indicator, labor markets were tighter during 1968 and 1969 than at 
any previous period in the postwar years. This helps explain the high rate 
of wage increases and inflation that the U.S. economy has suffered.  And it 
documents the growing need for structural policies in the labor market to 
reduce the inflation associated with a full employment economy. 
Measures of Labor Market Tightness 
There are various conceptual objections to using the aggregate unem- 
ployment rate to  measure labor  market tightness. For  instance,  many 
(including myself) argue that what matters is the difference between avail- 
able jobs and available employees to fill those jobs: This difference, rather 
than unemployment rates alone, should therefore be used as a measure of 
labor market tightness. If unemployment is conceived as an indicator of 
the gross excess supply of labor and vacancies as an indicator of gross excess 
demand, then subtracting vacancies from unemployment should provide 
an indicator of the net excess supply. Unfortunately, no comprehensive 
U.S.  vacancy statistics exist, so the practical importance of this point is 
hard to test. The scattered information available about vacancies, together 
with some conceptualized models of the employment process, suggests that 
there is a close, inverse relationship between unemployment and vacancy 
rates.' This means that some form of the unemployment rate itself is  a 
useful proxy for the difference between vacancies and unemployment. 
1. Charles  C. Holt, "How Can the Phillips  Curve  Be Moved To Reduce  Both Inflation 
and Unemployment?"  in Edmund  S. Phelps  and others, Microeconomic  Foundations  of 
Employment  and Inflation  Theory  (Norton, 1970),  pp. 224-56. A number  of papers  dis- 
cussing vacancy statistics are included in The Measurement  and Interpretation  of Job 
Vacancies  (Columbia  University  Press  for the National Bureau  of Economic  Research, 
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Available data do permit some other adjustments to the aggregate un- 
employment rate. The most promising candidates are those whose relation 
to  unemployment in recent years has been different from that in earlier 
periods. These offer the best chance of isolating independent influences in a 
measure of labor market tightness. And they seem most likely to determine 
what, if anything, is special about the recent inflationary period and what 
might change in the next few years. Three such adjustments are developed 
and tested in this paper. 
First, the official employment and unemployment data count all individ- 
uals equally. A better measure of available labor supply would allow for 
differences in the contributions individuals make to production when they 
are employed. Such an adjustment  is developed in this paper, leading to the 
concept of a weighted unemployment rate. Second, the official unemploy- 
ment rate is an average over all dimensions of the national labor market. 
Useful adjustments  to this average would account for imbalances that the 
average conceals,  such  as  highly  uneven  unemployment experience in 
various sectors of the labor market. A measure of unemployment disper- 
sion is developed in this paper to capture some of these effects. Third, the 
official unemployment concept includes only individuals actively looking 
for jobs. Some have argued that the appropriate unemployment concept 
should include individuals who are not in the job market but who would 
be if the demand for labor were greater.2  This concept, too, is tested below. 
Each of these adjustments makes use of the substantial changes that 
have been taking place over time in the age-sex composition of the labor 
force and in the unemployment experience of the age-sex groups. Table 1 
illustrates these trends. The left half of the table shows the percent of the 
total labor force in each group. In 1955, men of ages 25 to 64 (which I 
call the prime-age group, although that term is more  often used for  a 
narrower age range) constituted 56 percent of the work force, while in 1969 
they constituted 48 percent. At the same time there were large increases in 
the proportion of both women and young people of both sexes in the labor 
force. The right half of the table shows the change in the unemployment 
rates of other groups, relative to prime-age males, that has accompanied 
the steady decline in the latter group's proportion in the work force. This 
2. N. J. Simler  and A. Tella, "Labor Reserves and the Phillips Curve,"  Review  of 
Economics  and Statistics,  Vol. 50 (February  1968), pp. 32-49; and Robert J. Gordon, 
"The  Recent  Acceleration  of Inflation  and Its Lessons  for the Future,"  Brookings  Papers 
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unemployment rate ratio deteriorated  for all other groups during the 1960s, 
and for all but men over 65 years between 1955 and 1969. But by far the 
worst deterioration has been in the relative unemployment rates of young 
workers. 
A  WEIGHTED  UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE 
If all individuals offered closely similar supplies of labor, an aggregate 
unemployment measure could serve despite the changing size and unem- 
ployment experience  shown in Table 1. But large and persistent differences 
exist  in  the  labor supply offered by  individuals in  the  several age-sex 
groups.3 
For one thing, some individuals work more hours on the average than 
others. In large part because of the difference in the proportion of part- 
time workers and workers  holding more than one job, on average  prime-age 
men work more hours per week than prime-age women, while younger and 
older persons work fewer hours on average than the prime-age workers of 
either sex. On the reasonable assumption that the unemployed in  each 
age- sex group are offering an average number of hours of work similar to 
that provided by their employed counterparts, the correct relation between 
the labor input offered and the number of individuals unemployed varies 
according to the age-sex composition of the unemployed. 
A similar adjustment  is needed to account for the fact that average wages 
vary systematically  among age-sex groups. If a similar rate of wage increase 
for all workers is associated with any given degree of labor market tight- 
ness, then weighting groups by their relative wage levels is necessary in a 
model explaining  the change in average wages: A 10 percent change in the 
wage of workers  earning $2.00 per hour will have only half the effect on the 
aggregate wage average as will the same percentage change in the wage of 
a worker earning $4.00 per hour. A second way of looking at this kind of 
adjustment is to view wage differences as a proxy for productivity differ- 
ences. If the force of an unemployed worker on labor market tightness is 
measured by what he would contribute to production if employed, then 
again weighting by relative wages is called for. 
Combining the adjustments for average hours and average wages just 
3. Edward  F. Denison kindly gave me access to his worksheets  on these differences, 
prepared  for another  purpose.  The weighting  index discussed  here is based on his data. 416  George L. Perry 
discussed leads to the index for weighting individuals according to their 
age-sex group.4 And  adding up the weighted labor force and weighted 
unemployment permits the calculation of a weighted unemployment rate. 
The effect of weighting is not canceled in computing this new unemploy- 
ment rate concept since the relative importance of each of the various age- 
sex groups is not the same in employment and unemployment. For  the 
most part, the groups with high unemployment also have low values for the 
weighting index, indicating that, relative to  the  average employee, they 
earn lower wages or work fewer hours or both. 
Compared with the official unemployment rate, the weighted unemploy- 
ment rate gives a picture of a progressively tighter labor market in recent 
years relative  to earlier  periods. The spread  between  the official  and weighted 
unemployment rates has widened from less than half a point in the early 
1950s to a full point in the late 1960s. Earlier research suggests that the in- 
verse of unemployment rates is the preferred form for measuring labor 
market tightness, and it is the form used here.5 Figure 1 shows the inverse 
of the weighted unemployment rate for the postwar period, expressed as 
an index with 1956 equal to 100, and compares it with a similar index based 
on the official unemployment rate and with other indicators of labor mar- 
ket tightness discussed below. 
UNEMPLOYMENT  DISPERSION 
The weighted unemployment rate scales different members of the labor 
force more appropriately,  but still treats all workers as perfect substitutes. 
It recognizes the difference between one pint and one quart of an input, 
which the official unemployment rate does not; but it still treats the input 
as homogeneous, making two pints a perfect substitute for one quart. If 
labor force groups are in fact imperfect substitutes for one another, one 
should expect to find unemployment differentials among groups varying 
over time; and accounting for the changing dispersion of unemployment 
should lead to  a better measure of labor market tightness. The formal 
conditions under which the economy with more dispersed unemployment 
rates will be more inflationary, given the average unemployment rate, have 
4. The weights  used are given in the appendix. 
5. George L. Perry, Unemployment,  Money Wage  Rates, and Inflation  (M.I.T. Press, 
1966),  p. 55. 0% 
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been  presented elsewhere.6 But  a  host  of  practical problems arises in 
attempts to formulate a proper measure of dispersion for empirical testing. 
One problem comes in choosing useful ways to segment the overall labor 
market from available data. Statistics of varying quality and reliability are 
available for employment and unemployment by geographic regions, by 
occupational categories, by industry of last employment, and by age-sex 
and white-nonwhite groupings; the historical dispersion of unemployment 
by these classifications has been discussed by Gordon.7 Because the im- 
perfection of substitution among categories may be small in some of these 
cases, they are not equally good candidates for amending the average un- 
employment rate. For instance, individuals change the occupations and in- 
dustries in which they work quite easily. Some research has been done 
introducing geographic measures of  dispersion to  supplement average 
unemployment in a model explaining inflation, and this work shows that 
greater dispersion is associated with more inflation for a given average 
unemployment rate.8  On the other hand, Robert Hall, in his article in this 
issue,  suggests that most  of  the  observed differences in  unemployment 
among labor market areas in periods of full employment are characteristic 
of these areas, and that overall labor market tightness would not be sub- 
stantially improved by attempts to equalize the geographic unemployment 
differentials  that are observed. 
I have focused on the dispersion of unemployment among the age-sex 
groups of the labor force because the growing disparities in group unem- 
ployment rates shown in Table 1 suggest that substitution among them is 
quite imperfect.  The best mathematical form for a dispersion measure can- 
not be specified  without more knowledge than is now available about how 
individual labor markets interact and affect wages. I  chose to  measure 
dispersion as the sum over all age-sex groups of the absolute difference 
between each group's share of total weighted unemployment and its share 
of the total weighted labor force.9 This gives a dispersion measure that 
complements the weighted unemployment rate appropriately for  all the 
6. G. C. Archibald,  "The Phillips Curve and the Distribution  of Unemployment," 
in American  Economic  Association,  Papers  and Proceedings  of the Eighty-first  Annual 
Meeting,  1968 (American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 59, May 1969),  pp. 124-34. 
7. Robert A. Gordon, The  Goal  of Full Employment  (John Wiley, 1967),  pp. 91-116. 
8. Archibald,  "The  Phillips  Curve." 
9. Gordon  has used the same mathematical  form for measuring  dispersion  in Goal  of 
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cases of changing relative labor force sizes and changing relative unem- 
ployment rates that I have thought about. 
I tried several ways of adjusting the group unemployment rates, all of 
them designed to estimate, and then to eliminate from the dispersion mea- 
sure, the  "normal" differences in  unemployment rates among  groups. 
None of these attempts produced a dispersion measure that helped explain 
wage changes, while the use of unemployment rates without adjustment 
for normal differences  produced a successful dispersion measure. Probably 
the most important reason for this rather surprising outcome is the in- 
adequacy of the data. The quarterly  unemployment data by age-sex groups 
are not completely accurate. Adjusting them to eliminate normal unem- 
ployment differences  among the groups enlarges the relative importance of 
the errors, and the dispersion of these adjusted data becomes meaningless. 
The dispersion measure using unadjusted unemployment rates succeeds 
because the relative unemployment differentials widened steadily during 
the period, rather than oscillating. Thus, although the true dispersion of 
labor market tightness throughout the period may have been smaller than 
the dispersion of unemployment rates indicated, this error was largely a 
matter of scale; apparently  true dispersion grew as the dispersion of unem- 
ployment rates grew, which is what matters. 
The dispersion  measure, designated DU*, is shown in Figure 1, expressed 
as an index with 1956 equal to  100. In recent years, dispersion has been 
greater than at any previous time  for which the  series was computed, 
despite lower average weighted and official unemployment rates in some 
earlier years. And it has grown steadily every year from 1961 to 1969. 
A  COMBINED MEASURE 
Weighted unemployment and its dispersion, used together, provide an- 
other measure of labor market tightness. In order to compare it with other 
measures in Figure 1, the two were combined using as weights their co- 
efficients in an equation explaining wage changes, and the variable thus 
formed was expressed as an index with 1956 equal to  100. The equation 
itself is discussed extensively below. 
The combined measure reveals that labor markets were tighter in 1968 
and 1969 than in any previous year. By comparison, in these same years, 
the  measure using the conventional unemployment rate alone was sub- 
stantially below Korean war levels. 420  George L. Perry 
HIDDEN  UNEMPLOYMENT 
Many factors govern what fraction of the working-age population will 
be in the labor force at any time. The age-sex composition of the popula- 
tion is important  because labor force participation rates vary systematically 
among the age-sex groups. Over much of the postwar period, participation 
rates of individual groups have changed gradually. In addition, the partici- 
pation rates of some groups are cyclically sensitive, with the fraction of 
workers in the labor force larger when unemployment rates are low than 
when they are high. Thus with less than full employment, some potential 
workers do not enter the labor force and are not counted as unemployed. 
These are the hidden unemployed. 
I have estimated hidden unemployment over time using a model similar 
to Simler  and Tella's, which makes participation rates for individual age-sex 
groups depend on a time trend and the current unemployment rate.'0 But 
for the reasons given earlier, I have weighted hidden unemployment in the 
same way as regular unemployment. Hidden unemployment grows in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, then declines sharply, reaching negative values 
in the last years of the decade. This pattern arises for two reasons: (1) The 
relative importance in the population of those age-sex groups exhibiting 
cyclically sensitive participation rates changes, as it did with the expansion 
of the young age groups after the mid-1950s; and (2) in recent years, when 
the numbers of women and young persons in the labor force grew rapidly, 
actual participation rate experience deviated substantially from a predic- 
tion based on current unemployment rates alone. 
While the concept of hidden unemployment is itself well established for 
purposes such as projecting the potential output of the economy, its place 
in explaining wage changes is less clear. It is tried along with the other 
measures of labor tightness to test whether those not actively seeking work 
should play a role comparable to the unemployed in a model explaining 
wage changes. 
The Model  of Wage  Changes 
The labor market concepts just discussed are used as part of a model 
explaining wage changes. The parameters of the model are estimated from 
10. Simler  and Tella, "Labor  Reserves." Changing Labor Markets and Inflation  421 
quarterly data for the period from 1953: 1 to 1968:4. There were two rea- 
sons for starting the period in 1953. First, some of the disaggregated data 
needed to construct the different measures of labor market tightness are 
less reliable in the early postwar years. Second, I suspect that the years 
before  1953 were dominated by  events that  cannot be  adequately rep- 
resented in the basic model of wage changes used here. The immediate 
postwar years saw prices and wages rising rapidly and adjusting to  the 
disequilibrium  created by World War II and wartime controls. Then, not 
long after these effects were over, the outbreak of the Korean war brought 
first a rapid runup in both prices and wages and then a period of controls 
starting  in early 1951. While econometric work done some years ago had to 
include these periods because interesting observations were then so scarce, 
it now seems better to omit them. The sixteen years of observations avail- 
able from 1953 to  1968 include abundant periods of cyclical downturns, 
high and low unemployment, and the inflations of the mid-1950s and the 
late 1960s. To add years before 1953 to this sample seems to yield more 
noise than information. The observations after 1968 are used to test the 
forecasting ability of equations estimated through 1968. Changes in com- 
pensation per manhour during 1969 were rather puzzling and would have 
altered some of the estimates. I shall discuss this below. But since the data 
for 1969 and 1970 are preliminary  and subject to revision, it seemed better 
to base the main analysis on the data through 1968. 
The basic change variables in the model, such as changes in wages or 
prices, are used as percentage  changes over four quarters  in order to reduce 
the importance of inaccuracies in the basic data that would be prominent 
if  one-quarter changes were  used.  Correspondingly, variables used  as 
levels, such as unemployment and other measures of labor market tight- 
ness, enter the model as moving averages over four quarters of observa- 
tions, including the current quarter and three preceding ones. For several 
variables whose specification is somewhat complex, a fuller description is 
offered in the appendix. 
UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE 
The  official aggregate unemployment rate  U is one measure of  labor 
market tightness and is used here with only minor adjustments: The his- 
torical data are adjusted  for the changes in the definition of unemployment 
introduced in  1967 so that all observations are on the basis of the new 422  George L. Perry 
definitions. Also, the numbers in the armed forces are added to both em- 
ployment and the labor force, and 14- and 15-year-olds are added to the 
data, two changes that largely offset each other in their effect on the ag- 
gregate unemployment rate. This unemployment variable is used in the 
form 1/U. 
WEIGHTED  UNEMPLOYMENT 
The weighted unemployment rate U* is formed from the previous vari- 
able U by disaggregating  both the number unemployed and the number in 
the labor force into age-sex groups, multiplying the number of individuals 
in each group by the index discussed earlier, and summing the weighted 
unemployment and weighted labor force groups to form the weighted un- 
employment rate variable. It is used in the form 1/U*. 
UNEMPLOYMENT  DISPERSION 
The variable for unemployment dispersion DU* is formed thus: 
DU*  =  sum of  VP _  Li* 
V*  L* 
where Vi* and Li* are, respectively, the number of unemployed and the 
number in the labor force in an age-sex group weighted as before, V* and 
L  are the corresponding totals,  and the  sum is  taken over all age-sex 
groups. DU* can also be expressed in terms of unemployment rates: 
L  *  Uj* -  U  DU*  =  sum of  -  U*  L*  U 
where Ue and U* are the group and total weighted unemployment rates. 
HIDDEN  UNEMPLOYMENT 
Weighted hidden unemployment is based on an estimate of the number 
of persons who would have been in the labor force had the actual unem- 
ployment rate been 3 percent rather than its actual value in any quarter. 
The estimated number of hidden unemployed are weighted as above and 
divided by the weighted labor force to get HU*, the hidden unemployment 
rate used in the model. Changing Labor Markets and Inflation  423 
TOTAL  COMPENSATION  PER  MANHOUR 
For the basic wage variable to be explained by the model, I use the per- 
centage change over four quarters in compensation per manhour in the 
private nonfarm sector of the economy, designated w, with two  adjust- 
ments. The first accounts for the effect on average  compensation of changes 
in the age-sex composition of employment. Because hourly earnings differ 
among these age-sex groups, a change in the relative composition of total 
employment changes average compensation even if no individual's hourly 
compensation changes. My adjustment  uses the weighting factors discussed 
above to remove this effect of relative employment shifts among age-sex 
groups from w. The second adjustment  removes the effects of overtime pay 
and  of  interindustry shifts in  employment, using factors developed by 
Robert J. Gordon."  The two adjustments may overlap somewhat; but a 
regression test explaining w indicated that the two should be used together. 
The dependent variable in the wage equations, designated w*, is thus w 
corrected by both adjustments. 
LIVING  COSTS 
Most recent studies of the determinants of wage changes try to  allow 
for the effect on wages of living costs, as measured by the consumer price 
index (CPI). I use, alternatively, two measures of living costs in the wage 
equation: the four-quarter  percentage change in the index p, and the longer 
distributed  lag on changes in the CPI developed by R. J. Gordon as a proxy 
for expected price changes, designated  p*.12 
SECONDARY  EMPLOYMENT CHANGES 
One characteristic  of tight labor markets that may not be fully reflected 
in the unemployment  and dispersion variables is the tendency of employers 
to  hire more secondary workers in such circumstances. The percentage 
change over four quarters  in the employment of prime-age female workers 
is tried as an additional explanatory variable to capture such effects. The 
variable is designated.fe. 
11. R. J. Gordon,  "Problems  in Predicting  the Rate of Inflation"  (paper  presented  at 
the North American Regional Conference of the Econometric Society, New York, 
December 1969). 
12. Ibid. 424  George L. Perry 
WAGE-PRICE  GUIDEPOSTS 
A dummy variable G is introduced to capture the effects of the wage- 
price guidepost period. The guideposts are assumed to have been admin- 
istered with equal force from 1962:2 through 1966:4, and to  have been 
inoperative in other quarters. 
SOCIAL  INSURANCE  CONTRIBUTIONS 
Because the compensation data include nonvoluntary employers' con- 
tributions for social insurance, a variable measuring the impact of these 
contributions on w* is used in the estimation. It is designated c. 
Econometric  Estimates of Wage Changes 
Table 2 shows regression results for the basic wage change model using 
the variables  just described. Most of the equations in the table compare the 
accuracy of the various measures of labor market tightness in explaining 
wage changes.  13 
THE  WEIGHTED  UNEMPLOYMENT  RATE 
Equations (1) and (2) compare the weighted unemployment rate with 
the conventional unemployment rate as measures of labor market tightness 
in the basic wage model. The weighted unemployment rate does better. The 
higher R2 in equation (2) indicates that substituting weighted unemploy- 
ment for official unemployment explains 17 percent of the variance in wage 
changes left unexplained by equation (1). In addition, the coefficient on 
weighted unemployment has a slightly larger ratio to  its standard error 
than the coefficient on official unemployment does. These statistical differ- 
ences support my a priori judgment that the weighted unemployment rate 
13. All equations  were  estimated  using  an adjustment  for first-order  serial  correlation 
in the residuals,  shown  as r in Table  2. The summary  statistics  shown for each  equation- 
the proportion  of variance  explained  R,  and the standard  error of estimate  SE,-are 
computed  directly  from the coefficient  estimates, without using the serial correlation 
correction.  This permits  a better  comparison  of the alternative  measures  of labor market 
tightness  on the basis of the summary  statistics. 00  In  00 
u 
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was the better variable for explaining average wage  changes because it 
differentiates usefully among the members of the work force. 
UNEMPLOYMENT  DISPERSION 
Equation (3) introduces the variables measuring unemployment disper- 
sion  and the lagged change in secondary employment. It gives the best 
statistical fit of any equation, explaining 35 percent of the variance  that was 
left unexplained  by equation (1).14  All the improvement in fit over equation 
(2) comes from the dispersion variable. I include the lagged employment 
change variable  because it reduces the errors in 1956 slightly and because it 
keeps the coefficient on prices nearer to  that reported by other studies: 
Without it, the coefficient on prices drops to 0.27. 
The addition of the dispersion variable reduces the coefficients on both 
prices and the unemployment variable, while raising the estimated impact 
of the wage-price guideposts. This equation, using both weighted unem- 
ployment  and its  dispersion to  measure labor market tightness, is  my 
choice on a priori grounds as well as for its statistical fit. The combination 
of unemployment and dispersion plotted in Figure 1 is based on the co- 
efficients of the two variables in this equation. And the subsequent discus- 
sion of the inflation problem stems from it. 
HIDDEN  UNEMPLOYMENT 
Equation (4) explores the importance of the hidden unemployment con- 
cept for analyzing inflation by adding the variable for weighted hidden 
unemployment to the preferred  equation. The coefficient of the new varia- 
ble has the negative sign expected of it, but is only one-third the size of its 
14. The summary  statistics  still probably  understate  the improvement  over equation 
(1) that comes from using the better  measures  of labor market  tightness.  Price  changes 
are included as an explanatory  variable in the equations, and wage changes largely 
determine  price  changes.  Thus  if the official  unemployment  rate  understates  labor market 
tightness  in recent years, the coefficient  estimated on prices is likely to be higher to 
compensate  for this misspecification  on the labor market  variable.  This will reduce  the 
difference  in R2s between  the equations.  In fact, the progressive  improvement  in R2  in 
equations  (1), (2), and (3) when the price  term is omitted is much greater  than the im- 
provement  shown  in Table  2: The respective  R2S  go from  0.374  to 0.523  to 0.698  for  equa- 
tions estimated  without  the serial  correlation  adjustment  and without  a price  term as an 
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standard error. And the explanatory power of the whole equation, adjust- 
ing for the fact that an additional explanatory variable is used, actually 
declines, as indicated by the lower A? in equation (4). Hidden unemploy- 
ment, as measured here with weighted labor force variables, does not seem 
to  have any influence on wage changes. This is not surprising, since it is 
quite plausible that potential entrants to the work force exert nothing like 
the same downward  pressure on wages that is exerted by unemployed work- 
ers who are actively seeking jobs. 
A statistical problem arises in testing for the comparative importance of 
hidden unemployment and guideposts since, as the employment situation 
actually developed, the presumed depressing effect of hidden unemploy- 
ment on wage changes was greatest during the period when guideposts were 
being actively used. The technique of  separating hidden unemployment 
from  measured unemployment used  here is  a  better test  than  can  be 
achieved by combining the two into a variable for total unemployment; 
doing the latter forces the same coefficient on hidden and normal unem- 
ployment, leaving little to be explained by the guideposts. 
LIVING  COSTS 
Equation (5) uses the same labor market variables as equation (3) but 
substitutes Gordon's living cost variable with its long lags for the rate of 
change of living costs over four quarters.  The coefficient estimated for living 
costs is virtually identical, despite its considerably different lag structure. 
Compared with equation (3), equation (5) assigns more importance to dis- 
persion and less to weighted unemployment. Since I have reservations  about 
how accurately  the former variable captures dispersion effects, I prefer to 
analyze on the basis of equation (3), which gives it slightly less importance. 
Equation (3) also sharpens  the coefficient  estimates of the other explanatory 
variables, because it  relies on  a  smaller autoregressive correction and 
generally fits the data better, as shown by its high Ru. 
The coefficient on price changes in equation (3) indicates that 35 percent 
of a change in living costs is translated into a subsequent change in wages. 
It may be assumed that, given enough time, prices will rise by the full 
excess of wage changes over the trend growth in productivity, taken to be 
2.7 percent a year. If these estimates of the interaction between prices and 
wages are combined, eventually the difference  in the rate of wage increase 
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be about 1.5 times the immediate difference  estimated from the labor mar- 
ket coefficients  in equation (3). On the basis of this estimate, therefore, after 
a tightening of labor markets, wages and prices would rise 1.5 times faster 
in the long run than in the short run; but the rate of increase would not 
display the indefinite rise the accelerationist models would predict. 
The present research  is not aimed at a thorough test of the accelerationist 
hypothesis; it concentrates instead on developing improved measures of 
labor market tightness. The accelerationist view would presumably require 
that prices influence wages in an irregular way, with their impact growing 
larger as any inflationary condition persisted through time. By contrast, 
the price coefficient  in equation (3) must be understood as an average that 
best fits the data for the entire sample period. But while the regression esti- 
mates do not offer a test, a discussion of recent wage changes presented 
below does offer evidence against the accelerationist hypothesis. 
WAGE-PRICE  GUIDEPOSTS 
In both equations that use the combined measure of labor market tight- 
ness that I prefer, the wage-price guideposts are estimated directly to have 
reduced the rate of wage increase by about three-quarters of a percentage 
point. Allowing for the impact on prices of this much wage restraint, and 
the impact back on wage changes from lower prices, this implies about a 
1.2 percentage point reduction in the rate of inflation, 1.5 times the direct 
effect. 
SOCIAL  INSURANCE  CONTRIBUTIONS 
The variable accounting for employers' contributions for social insur- 
ance has a coefficient of about 1.4 in all the equations. Since there is a 
corresponding  change in employees' contributions, the simplest way to look 
at the estimate of  1.4 is that approximately 40 percent of the increase in 
employees' contributions is passed on to employers in the short run in the 
form of higher wages. 
It should be emphasized  that this estimate contains no information about 
the real burden of the social insurance tax, which is the primary concern 
of tax incidence theory. The real burden would depend on the effect on 
prices of both the employers' tax and the portion of the employees' tax 
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Recent Wage Changes 
The model represented  by equation (3) provides a good explanation of 
wage developments  during the inflationary  period from 1966 through 1968. 
As shown in Table 3, the errors are generally small and the equation does 
not persistently underpredict or overpredict actual wage changes during 
these twelve quarters.  This is also true for the first three quarters of 1970 
on the basis of preliminary  data. 
In 1969, however, the model overpredicts wage changes by an average 
of 0.9 percentage point. Part of the puzzle is in the behavior of  actual 
wages. Wage changes slowed by 0.21 percentage point between 1968 and 
1969. Allowing for the predicted effect of the increase in social insurance 
contributions that took  place, the slowdown was 0.33 percentage point. 
Table 3. Actual and Predicted Wage Changes, 1966-70 
Percentage changes over four quarters 
Year and quarter  Actuial  Predicted  Esrror 
Regression period 
1966  1  5.84  5.71  0.13 
2  6.30  6.32  -0.02 
3  6.50  6.66  -0.16 
4  7.07  7.08  -0.01 
1967  1  6.65  6.62  0.03 
2  6.38  6.58  -0.20 
3  6.45  6.54  -0.08 
4  6.01  6.74  -0.73 
1968  1  7.30  6.48  0.82 
2  7.28  7.80  -0.51 
3  7.51  7.77  -0.26 
4  8.24  7.84  0.41 
Forecast period 
1969  1  7.22  8.84  -1.62 
2  7.32  7.62  -0.30 
3  7.54  8.61  -1.07 
4  7.41  8.15  -0.74 
1970  1  7.29  7.90  -0.61 
2  7.57  7.74  -0.17 
3  7.99  7.72  0.27 
Sources: Actual-see  Table 2,  source and note a;  predicted-derived  from equation (3), using auto- 
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At the same time, rising prices and some further  tightening of labor markets 
led to a predicted wage speedup of 0.88 percentage point, more than half 
of which was due to prices. Thus, ignoring the autocorrelation adjustment, 
from 1968 to 1969 a 1.2 percentage point spread opened up between actual 
and predicted wage changes. 
It is hard to think of any model, based on any view of the inflation pro- 
cess, that would not predict some speedup of wage changes during 1969. 
All the measures of labor market tightness, including the official unem- 
ployment rate, point to  slightly tighter labor markets over the relevant 
quarters, while any view of the inflation process stressing the importance 
of recent price changes calls for a substantial acceleration in wages in 1969. 
The  adjustment for  the  changing age-sex employment mix  that  was 
made to the official compensation data was important in 1969. Without it, 
the slowdown in wage changes, instead of measuring  0.20 percentage  point, 
would have been 0.55 percentage point. Furthermore, with this adjustment 
and the Gordon adjustment for industry shifts and overtime, which be- 
comes substantial  in 1970, there is no sign of any slowdown in wage changes 
through 1970:3. The Gordon adjustments for 1970 are my own, estimated 
in a highly simplified  way, so not too much should be made of the figures 
for 1970 until Gordon's detailed calculations are updated. My estimates of 
the adjustment  for the first three quarters of 1970 add 0.25, 0.42, and 0.49 
percentage point  to  the  percentage wage  increase from  four  quarters 
earlier, very nearly the same adjustments Gordon estimates for the first 
three quarters of 1960, the start of the 1960-61 recession. 
THE  ACCELERATIONIST  THEORY 
The prediction errors for the whole of the current inflationary period 
offer evidence against the accelerationist view of the inflationary process. 
On this view, once labor markets become tight enough to start inflationary 
wage increases, wages and prices will accelerate indefinitely. Thus a given 
inflationary unemployment rate will be associated with ever faster rates of 
wage and price increases the longer it is maintained. 
If this view were relevant in an inflationary  period like the late 1960s, as 
the period continued, labor markets remained tight, and inflationary ex- 
pectations became more widespread, one would have expected actual wage 
increases to have outrun predicted wage increases by increasing amounts. 
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overpredicting  wage changes for the last part of the period after predicting 
accurately at the start of the inflation. The same point is made if 1969 is 
added to the period used in estimating the wage equation. Rather than 
increasing the price coefficient in the wage equation, the addition of 1969 
to the estimation period reduces it sharply-from  0.35 to 0.27. At the same 
time the coefficient estimate on dispersion falls to  0.056, while that on 
weighted unemployment  rises slightly to 0.077. So adding the 1969 experi- 
ence disrupts all coefficient estimates to some extent; but most noticeably, 
the results run counter to what one would expect from the accelerationist 
view. 
These conjectures from recent developments are necessarily tentative. 
What happens in 1971 could alter the impact of the evidence. And in any 
case, these estimates fall well short of formally testing the accelerationist 
theory. But they do constitute interesting evidence on an important issue 
that can be summarized simply. In recent years, wages have risen faster 
than predicted by an equation such as (1), based on the official unemploy- 
ment rate. But the errors characterize  the period of the last few years as a 
whole, and are adequately corrected by improving the measure of labor 
market tightness, as equation (3) does. They do not grow persistently or 
abruptly larger as the period progresses, as the accelerationist view would 
predict. If this view has applicability, it would appear to be for a different, 
perhaps more intensely inflationary environment than the  one we  have 
been experiencing. 
The Worsening  Trade-off 
The new measure of labor market tightness developed here has some 
striking implications for the trade-off between inflation and unemploy- 
ment. As it is conventionally conceived, the trade-off has worsened. Figure 
2 illustrates how much it has worsened since the mid-1950s on the basis 
of estimates using the combined measure of labor market tightness. 
The figure illustrates a steady-state trade-off in which any given unem- 
ployment rate has persisted long enough for the price-wage interactions to 
stabilize. This process was discussed in connection with the coefficient of 
living costs in the wage equation. 
The figure is based on the official concept of compensation per manhour. 
I assume that the employment mix adjustment makes w, this measure of 432  George L. Perry 
Figure 2.  The Shift in the Trade-off  between  Inflation  and Unemployment 
Anntaual  wvage  inicrease  Annutial  price  intcrease 
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a.  Based on 1967-70 experience. Changing Labor Markets and Inflation  433 
wage change, rise 0.26 percentage point (the 1953-68 average value of the 
adjustment) slower than w*, the adjusted measure used in the regressions. 
The Gordon  adjustment is trendless and requires no  correction for the 
steady-state calculations made here. 
The difference between the trade-off for the mid-1950s and the current 
trade-off, illustrated  in Figure 2, results from the changed relation between 
the official unemployment  rate and the combined measure of labor market 
tightness in the two periods. In the figure, at 4.0 percent unemployment, 
the annual rate of inflation is estimated to be 1.7 percentage points higher 
today than it would have been in the economy of the mid-1950s-4.5  per- 
cent rather  than 2.8 percent. This shift in the curve allows for the prediction 
errors from equation (3) for the two periods. For  1956-57, the equation 
underestimated  wage changes by 0.30 percentage point and for 1968-70 it 
overestimated by 0.34 percentage point. Allowing for the interactions be- 
tween wages and prices, I shifted the curve for the 1950s up by 0.5 percent- 
age point and the current curve down by the same amount in constructing 
Figure 2. 
Since Figure 2 relates wage changes to the official unemployment rate, 
while equation (3) is based on the combined measure of  labor market 
tightness, the expected relation between this rate and this measure is used 
in constructing  each of the trade-off curves shown. This expected relation 
takes demographic conditions as fixed and thus applies to  the trade-off 
curve in any one period. It does not describe the secular change in the 
relation that has been observed and that lies behind the shift in the curve 
illustrated in the figure. Historically, at a given point in time,  a  1 per- 
centage point difference in the official unemployment rate has been as- 
sociated with an estimated difference of 0.94 percentage point in the same 
direction in the weighted unemployment rate and a change of 0.036 in the 
opposite direction in the dispersion index. Each of the curves of Figure 2 
is based on these relations used together with equation (3). 
CHANGING  LABOR  MARKETS 
The trade-off  curves in Figure 2 are different because at the same official 
unemployment rate, the labor market is tighter today than it was in the 
mid-1950s. The change that has occurred in labor markets to cause this 
can be decomposed into two parts: A change in the proportion of workers 
in the several age-sex groups; and a change in the relative unemployment lo~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,  I  'o  I  4- 
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rates of these groups. In Table 4, the results of this decomposition are 
shown for the changes that occurred between 1956 and 1969. 
The third and fourth rows of the table show the effects of two kinds of 
adjustments. First, given the actual labor force composition that prevailed 
in 1969, if the average unemployment rate in each age-sex group had been 
the  same as it was in  1956, labor markets would have had the charac- 
teristics shown in row (3).  Second, labor markets would  have had the 
characteristics shown in row (4) if the 1956 labor force composition had 
been associated with the  1969 group unemployment rates. These hypo- 
thetical changes result in changes in the average unemployment rate, as 
well as in the other measures of labor market tightness developed here. 
In order to make a direct comparison among the four states of the world 
depicted in rows (1) through (4), they can be reduced to  a common un- 
employment rate-the  3.5 percent of  1969.15  The results are reported in 
the second half of the table. With this adjustment, the difference between 
rows (5) and (6) shows convincingly that the changes in relative unemploy- 
ment rates, or in labor force composition,  or in both, made 1969 labor 
markets tighter than those in 1956 at the same aggregate unemployment 
rate, In a comparison of row (5) with row (7), the shift in relative unem- 
ployment rates is singled out as the main source of this deterioration, for, 
if the 1956 relative  unemployment  rates had prevailed-as  row (7) depicts- 
labor market tightness would have been virtually the same in 1969 as in 
1956, despite the large increases in the number of secondary workers. 
Although it is primarily  the widening divergence of unemployment rates 
that has worsened the trade-off, this widening is itself related to the chang- 
ing composition of the labor force. As Table 1 shows, as the relative size 
of an age-sex group has grown, its relative  unemployment rate has generally 
worsened. The effect of this has been most  dramatic in the young  age 
groups. But it has also been true for prime-age women relative to men. As 
the  relative number of  prime-age men has diminished, employers have 
pushed the  already low  unemployment rate  of  this  group  even lower 
rather than expanding further the employment of other workers. 
A  good deal of substitution in employment across age-sex groups has 
been taking place, but it has not been sufficient to  keep unemployment 
rates from diverging. The proportion of jobs held by workers in the differ- 
15. These adjustments  were made using the relation between the aggregate  rate of 
unemployment  and the other  measures  of labor market  tightness  discussed  on p. 433. 436  George L. Perry 
ent age-sex groups has nearly kept pace with the changing proportion of 
workers in each group. In 1956, for instance, 15 percent of those employed 
were under 25 years old. In 1969, this age group accounted for 20 percent 
of the employed. Still, 50 percent of all the unemployed were under age 25 
in 1969, compared with 31 percent in 1956. In order to reproduce, in 1969, 
the  1956 pattern of relative unemployment rates, nearly one-half million 
jobs would have had to be shifted from prime-age workers to young work- 
ers, three-fourths of them from prime-age men. 
OTHER  FORCES AFFECTING  THE  TRADE-OFF 
One main reservation to all this is whether the age-sex groupings used 
here have failed to capture other forces that have been at work improving 
the trade-off. If the labor force had been standardized on lines other than 
age-sex groups, the change in the trade-off might have looked quite differ- 
ent. If educational achievement had been used, for instance, an improving 
trade-off could have appeared. It is impossible to test this proposition con- 
vincingly. I did, however, add a time trend to the model. If factors such as 
improving average education had pushed in the direction of improving the 
trade-off, the time trend might have captured their effect. The time trend 
took on a small negative value, but its coefficient was considerably smaller 
than its standard error. Introducing it into the equation also raised the 
coefficient of the dispersion variable so that there was no net change in 
the estimated deterioration of the trade-off. 
Future  Wage  Changes  and  Inflation 
It would be inappropriate to  offer a detailed inflation forecast for the 
near future without a model more complete than the one developed here. 
In particular,  the short-run influence of wage changes and other factors on 
prices has not  been analyzed. In  1967, 1969, and thus far in  1970, the 
private nonfarm deflator rose 3.1 or 3.2 percentage points less than the 
wage series used here. In  1968 the difference was 4.1 percentage points. 
For the whole period, there is slightly less price increase than long-run 
productivity experience would suggest. Some small catch-up of prices over 
wage costs could be in store, maintaining price inflation at a slightly higher 
rate than current wage changes would predict for a while. But this is highly Changing Labor Markets and Inflation  437 
conjectural and, in any case, a minor factor in the inflation outlook. Look- 
ing at consumer prices, one sees a quantitatively far bigger improvement 
in store as the current discrepancy  between increases in the deflator and the 
more rapid increases in the CPI is eliminated. Then the CPI will begin to 
change by approximately  the difference between the growth of wages and 
of productivity. 
Wage changes have been larger thus far in  1970 than most observers 
would have expected. By the third quarter, they were very near the predic- 
tions from equation (3). But if my downward adjustment  in that equation's 
predictions to allow for its average errors in the past two years was ap- 
propriate, then recent wage changes have been larger than one would have 
expected using the labor market model developed here. If the unemploy- 
ment rate settles at around 5.5 percent and the CPI moves into line with 
wage changes, I would expect inflation to slow to a 2.5 percent rate, but not 
for several quarters yet. If the equation is correct without adjustment- 
implying that 1969 wage developments  remain something of a mystery-the 
eventual inflation rate would be 3.0 percent. 
In the longer view, demographic changes by themselves should keep the 
trade-off over the next several years about where it  is  now.  The large 
changes in the relative composition of the labor force that have occurred 
should not continue to occur, primarily  because the large group of younger 
workers will be getting older. But neither will they be reversed. If the trade- 
off is to improve over this period, it will have to be as a result of changing 
relative unemployment  rates among the age-sex groups. And recent experi- 
ence gives no reason to hope for this development without explicit policy 
actions to bring it about. 
Policy Implications 
Economists have long recognized that management of aggregate  demand 
could reduce the unemployment problem to an essentially structural one. 
The expansion of demand in the late 1960s and the way labor markets 
responded to it make it clear that that point had been reached in the last 
years of the decade. Despite the intense total demand for labor that existed, 
and the tightest overall job  market since World War II, unemployment 
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The need to do something about large unemployment disparities, par- 
ticularly the  high unemployment rates among young  people,  has  been 
recognized as a social issue. The results presented here isolate the infla- 
tionary consequences of these unemployment patterns and show them to 
be substantial. 
It should be emphasized  that the weighting scheme presented here carries 
no implications about who should be unemployed. To choose a target value 
for the  weighted unemployment rate, or for the combined index, is to 
ignore the whole dilemma of the trade-off and settle for an inflation target 
instead. Society may feel more responsible for s6me kinds of unemploy- 
ment than others, or for the unemployment of some age groups more than 
others, but that implies some equity, or social, index, not the labor market 
indexes developed here. One could argue that society's greatest responsibil- 
ity is to provide an attractive labor market for young, new entrants into 
the work force. This would be the last step in fulfilling its acknowledged 
responsibility to prepare the young for a productive adult life. Yet this 
implies that individuals with the lowest weights in the present measure- 
and the highest unemployment rates of all age-sex groups-would  get the 
highest weights in the social index. I offer this not as a serious index of 
social preference,  but to emphasize the absence of any implied social pref- 
erence in the weighting scheme that has been used here. 
These results certainly carry a mandate for a better and more intensive 
structural approach to  labor markets than now exists. Broad fiscal and 
monetary policies are effective in  shifting an average measure of  labor 
market tightness; but if that was ever enough, it is not enough today. There 
are many reasons to expect persistent differences in unemployment rates 
for different labor market groups. To equalize them is an inappropriate 
and, furthermore,  hopeless task for policy makers.'6 But the deterioration 
in relative unemployment rates that has occurred cannot be brushed aside 
as inevitable or voluntary. 
Conceivably, better management of final demand could aid direct labor 
market policies. A change in the composition of final demand, to the extent 
that it can be related to the composition of labor demand, might help im- 
prove the pattern of unemployment rates. Thus one mix of output would be 
less inflationary  than another. But very little is known about what changes 
16. See Robert  Hall's  article  in this issue  for a discussion  of "normal"  unemployment 
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in this mix would be most useful or how large the potential improvement 
from this kind of policy is. 
A new effort in the spirit of the wage-price guideposts seems overdue. 
It offers no direct help on the particular  structural  problem identified here. 
But to the extent the trade-off has deteriorated, for whatever reason, the 
need for a new government  policy in this respect has grown; and the present 
results once again demonstrate  that guideposts helped when they were used. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the structural changes identified 
here do not imply that a high unemployment policy has any greater merit 
now  than it  ever did.  Unemployment rates in  each  group respond to 
changes in the average unemployment rate as they always have. To choose 
a higher average unemployment rate as a target for policy is to  choose 
higher unemployment rates for all labor force groups. What is needed is 
not a way to rationalize unemployment, but a way to reduce it where it is 
now highest. 
APPENDIX 
Variables  in the Model 
of Wage Changes 
SEVERAL  VARIABLES USED  in the model of wage changes developed here 
require a fuller description than was given in the text. 
The Weighting  Index 
The index  used  for weighting  labor force variables  is 
Ii=  JiK,, 
where Ji is the ratio of average manhours worked by persons in the ith 
age-sex group to the average hours worked by males aged 35-44, and Ki is 
the ratio of average hourly earnings of employed persons in the ith group 
to the average for males aged 35-44.  Annual estimates of J1 and K1 were 
obtained  from  Edward  Denison.  For the purposes  of this  paper,  variations 440  George L. Perry 
through time were insignificant. A  summary of the average values of Ii 
(where males aged 35-44  =  1.00) for the postwar period is given below:' 
Age group  Male  Female 
16-19 years  0.20  0.27 
20-24 years  0.57  0.38 
25-64 years  0.95  0.43 
65 and over  0.55  0.30 
Weighted Unemployment 
The weighted unemployment rate is 
U*-  L  nv 
where Vi is the number of unemployed and Li the number  in the labor force 
in the ith group and the sums are taken over all age-sex groups. 
Unemployment  Dispersion 
As shown in the text, dispersion was measured by 
L*  U*~U 
DU*e  I4  >j*i|UeU 
where U* is defined as above and 
UP=  IiUi 
Lt =  IiLi 
L*=  2IILi. 
The Wage Adjustments 
Two  adjustments are made to  the  official data on  compensation per 
manhour. The first is described by Robert J. Gordon and adjusts for the 
effects of overtime pay and interindustry  shifts.2  The second adjusts for the 
changing age-sex composition of employment. 
1. The weighted  unemployment  rate U*  was actually  formed  using  a more  detailed  age 
breakdown  than is shown here for 1i and using annual estimates of 1i rather than the 
postwar averages  shown. Because these refinements  made little difference,  all further 
calculations,  such as those behind  the dispersion  index and the adjustment  to the wage 
variable  discussed  below, used the index shown here. 
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This second  adjustment  corrects  the average  hourly  compensation  data 
for relative shifts in employment  among workers in different  age-sex 
groups.  It takes  account  of the differences  in average  hourly  compensation 
among  these  groups  as measured  by Ki, the wage  portion  of the weighting 
index Ii. The adjustment  to the wage  change  variable  has the form 
k _  EIAE,_  ZKAE, 
zIiEi  K,KzEi 
where  Ei is employment  in the ith group and the change  in employment 
AEi  is measured  over  the four quarters  spanned  by the wage  change  varia- 
ble. In forming  the adjusted  wage  variable  w* used in the regressions,  the 
adjustment  k is subtracted  from  the percentage  change  in the official  data 
on average  compensation  per manhour. 
Social  Insurance  Contributions 
Total compensation of employees is defined as 
W =  T +  W, 
where  T is employers'  contributions  for social insurance  and W is other 
compensation (out of which employees' contributions are deducted). If R 
is defined as T/W, the variable ct used in the wage equation is formed as 
C  Rt-1Rt_4  c 
1I- Rt_4 
This satisfies  the identity 
Wt =  Wt +  Ct, 
where  w and w are  the four-quarter  percentage  changes  in W and W. The 
coefficient  estimated  for ct can be shown  to be approximately  equal  to the 
fraction of T that is not borne by  W. If the coefficient exceeds 1.0, the 
excess indicates the fraction of  employees' contributions that is passed 
forward. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Charles Schultze: The weighted unemployment index that George Perry 
devised is an interesting  new concept. Because bodies are weighted by hours 
and relative  wages, it is virtually a wage-gap index-in  effect, the difference 
between the actual wage bill and the potential wage bill,  expressed as a 
ratio to the potential wage bill. It is an interesting companion to the GNP 
gap. I  want to  concentrate primarily, however, on  Perry's other major 
analytical device-the  dispersion index. 
The relationship of unemployment to the rate of wage change combines 
two  structural relations: (1) Unemployment is negatively related to  the 
excess demand for labor; and (2) the rate of wage increase depends posi- 
tively on the excess demand for labor. The relationship of excess demand 
to unemployment is convex to the origin, since unemployment cannot go 
lower than zero, but there is no upper limit on excess demand. The relation 
between the rate of wage increase and excess demand is usually assumed to 
be positively sloped and linear. The convex shape usually assumed for the 
relationship between unemployment and rates of wage increase reflects the 
convexity of the relationship between excess demand and unemployment. 
This makes sense for the total labor market or for any completely seg- 
mented labor market. 
If, however, there is substitutability, the relationship of excess demand 
to unemployment  is still convex to the origin but that of excess demand and 
wage increases could assume a concave shape. If the aggregate unemploy- 
ment rate is constant while tightness keeps increasing in a particular labor 
market, a given increase in excess demand in that market may lead to a 
smaller acceleration in the rate of wage increase. If there is growing tight- 
ness in  one  labor market-which  means,  given total  unemployment, a 
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growing surplus in another area-it  pays firms in the tight market to re- 
structure  jobs rather than to keep increasing the rate of wage increase. In 
order for a rise in dispersion  (again, given total unemployment) to lead to a 
larger rate of change in wages, the extra dispersion must lead to an addition 
to the rate of wage increase  for groups experiencing  a fall in unemployment 
that is greater than the decrease in the rate of wage increase for groups 
experiencing a rise in unemployment. 
The theoretical argument that greater dispersion intensifies the rate of 
wage increase  must then rest on the hypothesis that the combined relation- 
ship is not offsetting and therefore is still convex. My point is that the con- 
vexity is not necessarily expected on theoretical grounds, when individual 
labor markets with some substitutability are analyzed. This leads to the 
practical point that stronger proof is necessary in demonstrating a disper- 
sion effect, because there are no compelling a priori reasons for expecting it. 
The rise in the dispersion index over recent years could stem from two 
causes: First, it could reflect particular changes over time in the relative 
weights on the various groups. But Perry shows that this is not the reason. 
The second cause is the true one: widening over time of the unemployment 
differentials  among groups. Now there are two reasons why the unemploy- 
ment differences could widen. In the first place, widening unemployment 
rates could occur because of continuing changes in the composition of the 
labor force that outrun the ability of employers to  adapt. This develop- 
ment must depend on the rates of change; it must level off once the propor- 
tions settle down. However, the figures in Table 1 do not demonstrate a 
close relationship between the change in labor force proportions and the 
relative unemployment rates among groups. 
There is an alternate explanation of the phenomenon that gives Perry's 
results and that could explain some of the widening unemployment differ- 
ences, but it does not confirm a dispersion hypothesis. It depends on the 
shift  in  the  composition  of  unemployment that  Perry stresses, but  it 
depends on the particular  direction of that shift rather  than on the increase 
in dispersion. It is a sociological hypothesis-and  it troubles my soul to 
dabble in sociology, particularly  of this brand. Nevertheless, suppose some 
segments of the labor force have rapidly rising minimum reservation  prices 
for their services relative to  their marginal productivity; over time, the 
wages required  to induce them to offer their services would become further 
and further out of line with their marginal productivity. They would show 
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ket is substantially weakened. Specifically, among teenagers and young 
adults in the inner cities there may have been a revolution of rising expecta- 
tions. Teenagers and young adults are inclined to say: "I don't want those 
sweat jobs." There has been increased availability of nonwork assistance, 
under conditions that apply pretty high implicit marginal tax rates to labor 
income. Another way to  say this is that even after Perry's weighting, a 
systematic differential remains in  the  relationship of  the  rate of  wage 
increase to excess demand for different groups. And most important, the 
relationship for some groups has been changing over time. 
If the percentage of total unemployment accounted for by youth  goes 
up, as it has, from 31 percent in 1956 to 50 percent in 1969, Perry's results 
emerge. But on my hypothesis this would have nothing to do with disper- 
sion per se, but would reflect rather the revolution of rising expectations. 
Perry would still be correct in warning us of  a shift to  the right in the 
Phillips curve. But if my tentative and hypothetical argument is correct, 
then shifting the Phillips curve back to the left is not primarily a short-run 
problem of job training and location but a much more difficult long-run 
problem of motivation and expectations. 
Robert Solow: Perry's equation (3) performs well and is plausible. It is 
probably the best wage equation one can buy nowadays. It makes better 
sense to me than the various explanations resting on hidden unemployment, 
since those who stop seeking work probably exercise much less influence on 
wages. But I want to promote some skepticism, or at least a suspension of 
judgment, on the grounds that this type of alteration of wage equations 
may involve a lot of jobbing backwards  to fit the facts of recent experience. 
Perry's thesis is perfectly straightforward. He wants us to  believe that 
a  given unemployment rate (as  officially measured)  exerts  a  different 
degree of downward pressure on money wages, depending on the age-sex 
composition of the unemployed. Unemployed women and youths have a 
relatively  weak influence on wages because they are offering fewer hours of 
work and fewer dollars' worth of work per hour. According to his calcula- 
tions, it takes 3  1/2  teenage girls to push on wages as much as one prime-age 
man does. It then follows that any given measured unemployment rate puts 
less downward pressure on wages now than it did ten or fifteen years ago, 
because it is now made up of relatively more women and youth. Not only 
are there more  of  these people in the  labor market, but their relative 
unemployment experience has become worse. 
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the rapid  wage increases  of the past few years. I assume  that any wage 
equation  relying  on the conventional  unemployment  rate underestimates 
recent  wage  increases.  Two things  are done that improve  the recent  fit of 
the wage  equations.  One is the use of weighted  unemployment  instead  of 
conventional  unemployment.  The second  is the dispersion  index,  on which 
I share  some  of Charles  Schultze's  reservations.  Uneven  incidence  of unem- 
ployment  might  conceivably  put more  downward  pressure  on wages  if the 
unemployment  shifted  to groups  with  extraordinarily  low or extraordinarily 
steep Phillips curves among themselves.  Finally, the profits effect on 
wages-which Perry  found  important  in his earlier  work-has disappeared. 
Presumably  the low profits  of recent  years  would make  it even harder  to 
account  for the rapid  wage  rise of 1969-70. 
So I have  to be suspicious  of equation  (3), even  though  it performs  well 
and seems  plausible,  because  of the element  of jobbing  backwards  in look- 
ing for something  that would  explain  recent  history.  One could single  out 
other  factors  in an effort  to track  recent  experience.  Schultze  offered  one 
hypothesis.  Another  example  would be the duration  of unemployment. 
People  who have  been  unemployed  a long time put more  downward  pres- 
sure  on wages  because  they are  more  willing  to undercut  going  wage  rates 
in order  to get a job. The duration  of unemployment  has fallen  during  the 
four years  of full employment  that we have experienced,  and tends  to lag 
current  events,  so it might  help  to explain  what  has  been  happening  recently. 
One  might  hunt  for a worldwide  cause,  since  the problem  Perry  is trying  to 
explain  seems  to be popping  up in other  places  as well. The rate of wage 
increase  in the United Kingdom  is faster  now than would have been ex- 
pected  after  such a long period of relatively  high unemployment.  And I 
gather  much  the same  thing  is true  in Sweden.  None of these  explanations 
looks  better  to me  than  Perry's.  But  the nature  of the effort  to explain  recent 
experience  makes  me want  to suspend  a final  judgment  until  more  evidence 
rolls in. Still,  I should  emphasize  that if I needed  a wage  equation  tomor- 
row, I'd use Perry's. 
R. A. Gordon:  I agree  with  Perry's  main  conclusion  that a 4 percent  over- 
all unemployment  rate  implies  a tighter  labor  market  now  than  it did in the 
1950s.  As has been suggested,  one can think of a variety  of reasons  why 
this might  be so, not necessarily  the specific  reasons  that Perry  gives.  One 
hypothesis  is that  the length  of time  that a tight  labor  market  has obtained 
makes  a difference.  I tried  to test this duration  factor  but  there  is only one 
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Age-sex  composition  has  changed  and  made  a difference.  The 1967  unem- 
ployment  rates  with  the 1967  weights  on age and  sex resulted  in a 3.85 per- 
cent unemployment  rate. If the 1956  weights  for age, sex, and color are 
applied  to 1967,  the adjustment  for color  reduces  the 3.85 only  to 3.83 per- 
cent. The proportion  of blacks in the labor force has not changed  the 
unemployment  rate very much, despite their high unemployment  rate. 
Adjusting  1967  to the 1956  sex composition  then reduces  the unemploy- 
ment  rate  from  3.83  to 3.71, or by 0.12  percentage  point.  If, in addition,  the 
1967  labor  force  is adjusted  to the 1956  age  composition,  the rate  drops  an 
additional  0.14  point  so that  the 3.85  percent  unemployment  rate  in 1967  is 
reduced  to 3.57  if the age, sex, and  race  weights  of the previous  period  had 
applied. 
If age-sex  composition  makes  a difference,  this implies  something  about 
the process  of wage  determination.  It implies  something  about  the key  role 
of the prime-age  male group in that process.  The unemployment  rate of 
white  prime-age  men  may  have  fallen  so much  absolutely  and relatively  in 
the late sixties  that  the push  upward  on their  wages  spilled  over  into other 
groups, even though unemployment  rates of these other groups have 
worsened  relative  to the national  rate. 
Perry's  weighting  of unemployment  rates  by relative  wage  levels  implies 
that  transmission  of wage  changes  from  tight  to looser  labor  markets  is not 
made  in terms  of percentage  changes.  If the transmission  is in terms  of per- 
centage  changes  rather  than  dollars  and  cents,  is weighting  really  necessary? 
It is my impression  that when  labor  markets  tighten,  low wages  generally 
tend  to rise  relatively  more  rapidly  in percentage  terms  than  do high  wages. 
As to the use of the dispersion  measure,  it might  be worth  looking  at the 
cyclical,  as well  as secular,  behavior  of this  measure.  It has  a regular  cyclical 
pattern  that differs  for age, sex, and color, and also for occupation  and 
industry.  In addition,  there  are  the secular  changes  Perry  concentrates  on, 
which  unquestionably  show deterioration  since 1958.  From 1966  to 1969, 
the dispersion  index  takes  a big  jump.  Mobility  apparently  is getting  much 
better  among  occupations  but  worsening  between  sexes-so to speak-and 
among  the young. I agree  with Perry  that the rising  share  of youth and 
women  in the labor force has served  to increase  the upward  pressure  on 
wages  for a given  overall  unemployment  rate. 
Finally,  I am not impressed  by the results  on the guideposts,  and still 
believe  the weight  of the evidence  in explaining  the 1962-66  period  is on the 
side of the hidden  unemployment  thesis. For 1966-69,  I agree with the 
general  approach  of the Perry  paper,  stressing  labor  force  composition  and Changing  Labor  Markets  and  Inflation  447 
dispersion,  but I would add the long duration  of a low unemployment 
economy  as another  factor. 
George  Perry: In response  to Robert Solow, I can only report  that the 
intellectual  history  of weighted  unemployment  and dispersion  is not pri- 
marily  a matter  of hunting  for some handy  factor  to explain  rapid  wage 
increases.  I regard  the weighted  unemployment  rate  as so entirely  plausible 
a priori  that  I need  no ulterior  motivation  to make  that amendment  to the 
standard  unemployment  rate.  I also consider  the dispersion  index  a quite 
plausible  amendment  to standard  unemployment,  to signify  that the stan- 
dard  rate  is not  telling  us the same  thing  today  as it was  at some  other  time. 
A given  unemployment  rate  composed  of a much  tighter  labor  market  in 
one area  and a much  looser one in another  ought  to be telling  a different 
story.  Whether  the dispersion  index  should  have  as much  power  as it does 
in my results  is another  question,  and  I fall back  on the basic  facts.  I tried  a 
time  trend  and various  other  things,  and they didn't  reduce  the estimated 
impact  of dispersion. 
Let me say to R. A. Gordon  that  this paper  was not designed  to present 
new  tests  of the guidepost  proposition.  I report  the results  from  a variety  of 
equations:  By and  large,  the guideposts  showed  up with  the right  sign and 
some  measure  of significance;  hidden  unemployment  did not. I have  never 
seen theoretical  or empirical  evidence  that convinces  me of the hidden 
unemployment  effect  on wages. 
I agree  completely  with Schultze's  point that the widening  differentials 
between  the employment  rates of young people and of adults shift the 
Phillips  curve  as I have indicated  whether  they arise  from an inability  of 
employers  to adapt  to the changed  labor  force  composition-the demand 
side-or  from a changing  reservation  price on the part of young people 
looking  for jobs-the  supply  side. Indeed,  if it is the latter,  the change  is 
presumably  more  inflationary,  since  the labor  market  for younger  workers 
is then tighter  at a given  unemployment  rate. 
General  Discussion 
R. J. Gordon  felt  that  Perry's  verdict  against  hidden  unemployment  was 
inconclusive,  because  the hidden unemployment  variable  did not enter 
Perry's  equation  in the nonlinear  way the other  unemployment  variables 
did, and because  the guidepost  variable  was used simultaneously  with it. 448  George L. Perry 
Franco  Modigliani  reported  encouraging  results  from  wage  equations  that 
separate  the  union  and  nonunion  sectors.  The  union  sector  takes  account  of 
the number  of negotiations  in any  given  period.  He found  no evidence  that 
the guideposts  had  worked  in either  sector. 
Charles  Holt, Franco  Modigliani,  and Charles  Schultze  suggested  alter- 
native  ways  in which  the dispersion  variable  might  be constructed.  It was 
generally  agreed  that the best form of the index  depended  on one's theo- 
retical  views about labor market operations.  Holt and Modigliani  also 
would have preferred  results based on one-quarter,  rather than four- 
quarter,  wage changes.  Another  suggestion,  made by Saul Hymans,  was 
that  lagged  as well  as current  unemployment  should  be introduced  into the 
equation. 